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ABSTRACT 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia in 2005 
resulted in goodwill accounting shifting from systematic annual amortisation to impairment 
testing. We examine whether IFRS adoption changed the association between takeover 
premiums and the difference between a target firm’s pre-acquisition market and book values 
(pre- acquisition step-up). Our results show a negative association between takeover premiums 
and the pre-acquisition step-up of the target firm. This association reduces however, after 
Australia adopted IFRS and no longer required goodwill amortisation. Consistent with the 
incentives arising from contracts written around accounting numbers, our results are strongest 
for bidding firms which compensate their CEO using an accounting-based bonus plan. These 
results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. 
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The method of accounting for a business combination has long been controversial. A 
significant issue in this debate is how to account for the difference between the acquisition 
price and the book value of the target firm’s net assets at the acquisition date (i.e., step-up).1 
Interestingly, this debate exists even though the accounting method for the step-up has no cash 
flow consequences. As such, the reason for contention over the appropriate accounting method 
typically focuses on how the method of accounting leads to lower post- acquisition earnings if 
all or part of the step-up is subject to systematic amortisation or depreciation charges (Gagnon, 
1967; Copeland and Wodjak, 1969 and Aboody et al., 2000). 
We contribute to this debate by investigating the association between takeover premiums and 
the target firm step-up and whether any association is influenced by the financial reporting 
environment and CEO compensation incentives. Specifically, we investigate: i) the association 
between the target firm pre-acquisition step-up and premiums; ii) whether this association 
changed when Australia adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and iii) 
whether any association between premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up is driven 
by incentives arising from accounting-based compensations plans offered to the bidding firm 
CEO. 
Due to the mechanical relationship between premiums and the step-up we cannot directly test 
for an association but instead rely on a proxy measure. This measure is calculated as the target 
firm market capitalisation two months prior to the takeover announcement minus the book 
value of target firm equity at the end of the prior financial year. We refer to this measure as the 
                                                 
1 To highlight the divergence in opinion over the method of accounting for the step-up, the last 15 years has seen 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
move from goodwill amortisation to goodwill impairment; the FASB prohibit the pooling method of accounting 
and the U.K. Accounting Standards Board disallowing the direct write-off of goodwill against reserves. 
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pre-acquisition step-up. As this measure is unaffected by the offer price it avoids a mechanical 
relationship. 
The motivations for this study are twofold. Firstly, prior studies examine many factors as 
explaining premiums. These factors include: payment method (Huang and Walkling, 1987; 
Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Da Silva Rosa et al., 2000), takeover competition and hostility 
(Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007), target firm ownership structure (Stulz, 1988), 
and target firm leverage and free cash flow (Jensen., 1986; Israel, 1991). However, minimal 
attention has been given to whether takeover premiums are associated with the method used to 
account for a business combination. 
Building on earlier U.S. research (Aboody et al., 2000 and Ayers et al., 2002), we contend that 
if accounting standards require goodwill amortisation (i.e., pre-IFRS) bidding firms minimise 
the premium offered to target firms with a higher pre-acquisition step-up. This contention is 
based on managers’ incentives to maximise reported income. In contrast, we expect that this 
association is reduced when accounting standards are revised to remove systematic goodwill 
amortisation (i.e., post-IFRS). To support our argument that the association between premiums 
and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up is driven by incentives to maximise reported 
earnings, we expect that our predictions hold only for bidding firms which remunerate CEOs 
using accounting-based bonus plans. 
Secondly, numerous studies have examined the impact of IFRS adoption on users of financial 
information with many studies reporting benefits following adoption (e.g., Barth et al., 2008, 
Chalmers et al., 2011a, Chalmers et al., 2012, Cotter et al., 2012; Brochet et al., 2013).2 Our 
study extends this body of work by examining if IFRS adoption impacted firms’ economic 
decision making and highlights possible negative consequences of IFRS adoption.  
                                                 
2 In contrast, to these results Lai et al. (2013b) document a reduction in accrual reliability after IFRS adoption. 
4 
 
We test our contentions using a sample of Australian takeovers before and after IFRS adoption. 
We find a negative association between takeover premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition 
step-up with this association reducing after Australia’s adopted IFRS. Further analysis 
indicates that these findings occur only where the bidding firm remunerates the CEO using an 
accounting-based bonus plan. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. 
This study makes a number of contributions. Firstly, we extend prior research by examining 
the contractual incentives (Clinch, 1995) which influence the association between takeover 
premiums and goodwill accounting methods (Robinson and Shane, 1990; Choi and Lee, 1991; 
Ayers et al., 2002; James et al., 2008). This study also adds to literature examining the impact 
of Australia’s adoption of IFRS, and more specifically, the move from goodwill amortisation 
to goodwill impairment (Chalmers et al., 2011b). Our results suggest that the move to goodwill 
impairment led to bidding firms paying a higher premium for target firms with a higher pre-
acquisition step-up resulting in a greater potential wealth transfer from bidding to target firm 
shareholders.  
We also add to prior literature studying the effect of management compensation plans on 
accounting choice (Fields et al. 2001 and Armstrong et al. 2010). Our evidence is consistent 
with CEOs responding to the incentives provided from their compensation structure to take 
advantage of a change in accounting practices to maximise potential personal gains (e.g., 
Beneish 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the accounting rules 
which apply to the step-up. Prior research and hypotheses are discussed in section 3, whilst 
section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 describes the sample selection and presents 
descriptive statistics. Results are provided in section 6 and section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Accounting for the step-up in target firm net assets 
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AASB 1013, introduced in 1988, was the first mandatory Australian accounting standard 
applying to the recognition and measurement of the step-up. The standard required the step-up 
to be first recognised by adjusting target firm’s recorded net assets and all identifiable 
intangible assets to their fair value. Any remaining difference is then recorded as goodwill and 
amortised over a maximum life of 20 years.3 Although, this accounting method has no cash 
flow effects, it has the effect of reducing post- acquisition. After the adoption of IFRS in 2005 
AASB 136 Impairment of Assets required that goodwill was no longer amortised but subject to 
annual impairment testing.4 
In contrast to Australia, preceding the issue of SFAS 141 Business Combinations in 2001, 
acquiring firms in the U.S. could avoid recording the step-up and the higher subsequent 
depreciation and amortisation charges by structuring an acquisition to qualify for the use of 
pooling accounting (Accounting Principles Board Opinion No.16, Business Combinations). 
From 2001, SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, mandated the use of the purchase 
method and removed the requirement for goodwill amortisation. 
 
3. Prior research and hypotheses development 
Early Australian studies document, that, many firms prefer to avoid goodwill amortisation. For 
example, Gibson and Francis (1975) and Anderson and Zimmer (1992) show that prior to 
AASB 1013, the most common methods of accounting for goodwill avoided systematic 
goodwill amortisation. Furthermore, after the introduction of AASB 1013 firms continued to 
oppose goodwill amortisation with some firms claiming that the necessity to amortise goodwill 
meant they were at a competitive disadvantage in the international acquisition arena (Porter, 
1994; Miller, 1995). 
                                                 
3 Unlike the U.S., Australian accounting standards did not allow the use of the pooling method of accounting for 
a business combination. 
4 The adoption of IFRS resulted in other changes to Australian accounting principles. The impact of these other 
changes is considered in more detail in section 6.3. 
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Given the lack of a cash flow effect, the motivation of managers to avoid goodwill amortisation 
is generally explained by incentives associated with reporting higher profit. For example, prior 
U.S. studies conclude that firms structured acquisitions to qualify for the pooling method of 
accounting in order to report increased profit (Gagnon, 1967; Copeland and Wodjak, 1969). In 
addition, Aboody et al. (2000) and Ayers et al. (2002), show that the use of the pooling method 
is more likely for target firms which have a greater step-up.5 They argue that firms prefer to 
account for these acquisitions using pooling because the higher step-up would otherwise result 
in material levels of income reducing depreciation and amortisation charges if accounted for 
using the purchase method. 
The impact of incentives arising from management compensation plans on accounting choice 
has been widely studied in prior research (Fields et al., 2001). In the context of accounting for 
business combinations, Gore et al. (2000) show that manager’s preference for the capitalisation 
and amortisation of goodwill in the U.K. is lower when managers are compensated using bonus 
schemes based on rolling GAAP. Aboody et al. (2000) examine the choice between the pooling 
and purchase method in the U.S. and document that the use of the pooling method increases 
significantly for target firms with a greater step-up when the CEO of the acquirer is paid a 
bonus based on accounting earnings. 
More recently, Shalev et al. (2013) find that following the removal of goodwill amortisation 
managers compensated using accounting-based bonus plans allocated a greater percentage of 
the acquisition price to goodwill. Consistent with this result, Ramanna (2008) finds that firms 
which lobbied on the exposure draft preceding SFAS 142 removing goodwill amortisation paid 
significantly higher bonuses to their CEOs. Other studies have documented that firms are less 
likely to record a goodwill impairment charge when they have an accounting-based bonus plan 
                                                 
5 Consistent with this study, to avoid a mechanical relationship Ayers et al. (2002) use a measure of the target 
firm’s pre-acquisition step-up as a proxy for the actual step-up in an acquisition. 
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in place (Beatty and Weber, 2006) and the recognition of a goodwill impairment charge results 
in lower CEO compensation (Darrough et al. 2014). 
Since the step-up is calculated as the difference between the acquisition price and the book 
value of the target firm’s net identifiable assets, higher takeover premiums by definition result 
in a higher step-up. Given managers’ preference for maximising reported income, the method 
of accounting for the step-up is therefore, likely to influence the size of the premium offered. 
That is, when the step-up, or a greater proportion of the step-up needs to be expensed bidding 
firm managers are expected to be more reluctant to increase the size of the step-up by offering 
higher premiums. 
This association between takeover premiums and the method of accounting for goodwill has 
been examined in a number of prior studies. Choi and Lee (1991) compare premiums in the 
U.K. with those in the U.S. and report significantly higher premiums in the U.K. This result is 
explained by the ability of U.K. acquirers (during the period of that study) to write-off goodwill 
immediately against reserves rather than amortise the amount to income. Findings from the 
U.S. (Robinson and Shane, 1990 and Ayers et al., 2002) also indicate that bidding firms which 
do not need to amortise goodwill (i.e., when using the pooling method) pay an additional 
premium relative to acquisitions which are required to amortise goodwill.6 Other studies also 
indicate that acquirers are willing to pay an additional premium in acquisitions in which 
goodwill can be claimed as a tax deduction (Lee and Choi, 1992; Ayers et al., 2000). 
Building on these prior findings we predict that there is an association between the method of 
accounting for the step-up and takeover premiums in Australia. Prior to 2005, Australian firms 
amortised that part of the step-up recorded as goodwill. As the size of the premium 
mechanically increases the step-up a higher premium is likely to result in greater future 
                                                 




amortisation charges. Assuming bidding firm managers are concerned with the impact of 
amortisation on post- acquisition profit they have an incentive to constrain the size of the 
premium. Furthermore, this issue is exacerbated in takeovers where the difference between a 
target firm’s pre-acquisition market and book values (i.e., pre-acquisition step-up) is large as 
bidding firm managers already confront a large write-up in target firm assets. U.S. research 
(Aboody et al., 2000 and Ayers et al., 2002) for instance, documents that it is these target firms 
(i.e., those with a large pre-acquisition step-up) which were more likely to be acquired using a 
pooling transaction. As Australian bidders were not allowed the option of using pooling 
accounting for such target firms, we expect that they instead respond by minimising any further 
increase in the step-up by lowering takeover premiums. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Prior to the adoption of IFRS, there is a negative association between takeover 
premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up. 
Prior Australian evidence is however, inconsistent with this hypothesis. James et al. (2008) 
analyse the association between takeover premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up 
before and after the introduction of AASB 1013. They find a negative association between the 
target firm pre-acquisition step-up and premiums with this negative association weakening 
after AASB 1013’s introduction.. A possible explanation for these inconsistent findings is that 
the pre- AASB 1013 firms in James et al. (2008) used a multitude of different accounting 
methods, which reduces the ability of their analysis to assess the impact of the introduction of 
the accounting regulation.  
Although non-Australian studies present results consistent with H1 they are subject to a number 
of weaknesses. First, as noted by Clinch (1995), they do not test if the association between the 
method of accounting and takeover premiums is driven by contracts written around accounting 
numbers such as management compensation plans. This study addresses this weakness. 
Second, the U.S. findings are subject to alternative explanations. For instance, the higher 
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premium in pooling acquisitions is possibly explained by the superior bargaining position of 
the target in these transactions because, as described by Nathan (1988), the criteria to qualify 
for pooling under APB 16 required the support of the target firm. In addition, it is possible that 
firms’ which are accounted for using the pooling and purchase method differ across multiple 
dimensions and it is these dissimilarities which lead to differing premiums rather than the 
difference in accounting methods (Clinch 1995). This endogeneity concern has been 
acknowledged in prior U.S. research (Robinson and Shane, 1990 and Ayers et al. 2002). As 
Australia has never allowed a choice between the purchase and pooling method, this study is 
not subject to such endogeneity concerns. Additionally, by limiting our study to one country 
we avoid problems arising from comparing takeover premiums across countries with different 
institutional environments (e.g., Choi and Lee 1991). 
After the adoption of IFRS, Australian firms no longer amortise goodwill. In consequence, we 
expect bidding firm managers were less concerned with adding to the size of a target firm’s 
pre-acquisition step-up through the payment of a higher premium as the portion of the actual 
step-up recorded as goodwill would no longer reduce post- acquisition profit. As such, we 
predict that post- IFRS, the negative association between the target firm pre-acquisition step-
up and the takeover premiums lessens.7 This expectation is formally stated as: 
H2: After the adoption of IFRS, the negative association between takeover premiums and the 
target firm pre-acquisition step-up reduces. 
Our two hypotheses assume managers’ have a preference for choosing accounting methods to 
maximise reported profit. A contractual incentive to maximise reported profit arises from the 
use of management compensation plans and earlier studies indicate that managers often make 
                                                 
7 It is acknowledged that after Australia’s adoption of IFRS, it is possible that post- acquisition profit may be 
reduced due to goodwill impairment. A goodwill impairment charge differs to goodwill amortisation however, 
as it is not a certain systematic annual charge to profit and managers have arguably more discretion as to when 
the charge is recorded. Furthermore, at the time of announcing a takeover, bidding firm management is unlikely 
to contemplate the need to impair goodwill particularly if they are ‘infected’ with hubris (Roll 1986). 
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accounting choices to maximise possible bonuses (Fields et al., 2001). In relation to the 
accounting for acquisitions, prior research shows that the preference for adopting accounting 
methods which avoid a reduction in post-acquisition earnings are greater for firms which use 
management compensation contracts linked to accounting numbers (Aboody et al., 2000 and 
Gore et al., 2000).  
Before IFRS adoption the income decreasing effect of goodwill amortisation has a direct 
personal financial consequence to Australian CEOs with an accounting based performance plan 
in place. These CEOs also received the most financial benefit from the change in accounting 
method from goodwill amortisation to impairment testing. In contrast, for CEOs without an 
accounting-based bonus plan in place the method of accounting for goodwill has no direct 
financial consequences. As a result, H3 predicts that the negative association between takeover 
premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up pre- IFRS (H1) and the reduction of this 
association after Australia’s adoption of IFRS (H2) exists only for bidding firms with a CEO 
who is compensated using an accounting-based bonus plan. 
H3: The negative association between takeover premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition 
step-up and the reduction of this association after the adoption of IFRS occurs only for bidding 
firms which offer an accounting-based bonus plan to their CEOs. 
 
4. Research method 
The following model is estimated to test our hypotheses: 
PREMIUMi = i + 1PRESTPi + 2IFRSi + 3PRESTPxIFRSi + 4MULTIPLEi +  
5FRIENDLYi + 6CASHPAYTi + 7TOEHOLDi + 8TGTDIROWNi + 9TGTROEi + 
10TGTLEVi + 11TGTSIZEi + 12TGTFCFi   + INDUSTRY + i                                  (1a) 
 
The dependent variable (PREMIUM) is the takeover premium measured as the initial offer 
price minus the target share price two months prior to the takeover announcement, divided by 
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the this share price.8 Consistent with prior studies (Nathan, 1988 and Ayers et al., 2002), the 
target firm’s pre-acquisition step-up is approximated by subtracting the target firm book value 
of equity t the date of the financial statements provided before the takeover, from target firm 
market capitalisation measured two months before the takeover announcement, divided by the 
book value of equity (PRESTPEQ). This measure is used as the actual step-up is mechanically 
increased by the takeover premium. To minimise the possibility that our results are driven by 
scale effects, we also present results scaling PRESTP by average target firm assets over the two 
years before the takeover announcement (PRESTPASSETS). An indicator variable (IFRS) is 
set to one for takeovers announced during financial years in which the firm prepares financial 
statements using IFRS. To test H2 each measure of the target firm PRESTP is interacted with 
the IFRS indicator variable (PRESTPxIFRS).  
The control variables in regression model (1a) are informed by previous research. Premiums 
are expected to increase with competing bidders for a target firm (e.g., Flanagan and 
O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Henry, 2005). Takeovers with multiple bidders are identified using an 
indicator variable (MULTIPLE). Takeover hostility has been documented to result in higher 
premiums (e.g., Bugeja and Walter, 1995; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Holl and Kyriazis, 1996). 
We measure the attitude of the target firm using an indicator variable coded as one if the initial 
target board recommendation is takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY). Previous research (e.g., 
Huang and Walkling, 1987; Kaufman, 1988; Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa, 2010) shows 
premiums are higher when cash consideration is offered because cash payment is immediately 
taxable. Method of payment is controlled in the regression model using an indicator variable 
denoting payment which is exclusively cash (CASHPAYT). 
                                                 
8 If equity is offered as consideration, the bidding firm share price two months prior to the takeover 
announcement is used to calculate the value of the initial offer. 
12 
 
Target firm ownership structure is also expected to affect premiums. A higher bidding firm 
toehold (TOEHOLD) in the target improves the bidder’s bargaining position as it is necessary 
to acquire fewer shares and is expected to lower premiums (e.g., Stulz, 1988 and Stulz et al., 
1990). The target firm bargaining position is greater when the target firm board owns a greater 
proportion of outstanding shares. As such, we include target firm board ownership as a control 
in the model and expect this variable to be positively associated with premiums 
(TGTDIROWN). An agency perspective however, suggests the opposite association since 
agency problems increase at low levels of target ownership. If takeovers are intended to solve 
target firm agency conflicts, then premiums are predicted to increase at lower levels of target 
board ownership (Manne, 1965; Fama, 1980). 
Controls are also included for a number of target firm financial characteristics. Following 
Schwert (2000), we control for target firm performance using the return on equity ratio 
(TGTROE). Israel (1991) and Israel (1992) suggest that leverage is positively associated with 
premiums as highly levered firms have a more concentrated ownership structure. Target firm 
leverage is measured using the debt to equity ratio (TGTLEV). Target firm size influences the 
negotiating position of the target firm and as a result, premiums are predicted to increase with 
size (Moeller et al., 2004). Target size is measured using the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation at the financial year end prior to the takeover announcement (TGTSIZE). Jensen 
(1986) suggests that takeovers which reduce the agency costs of free cash flow result in higher 
premiums. Free-cash flow is measured as cash flow from operations less dividends, divided by 
average total assets (TGTFCF). Each of these financial variables is measured using information 
extracted from the most recent target firm financial statements prior to the takeover 
announcement. Information on whether the bidding firm compensates their CEO using an 
accounting-based bonus plan is manually collected from the annual report for the financial year 
before the takeover announcement. 
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As an extension of model (1a), we also estimate regression model (1b) using only listed 
Australian bidders. This sample restriction allows us to include a number of bidding firm 
financial characteristics in the model. This expanded regression model is as follows: 
PREMIUMi = i + 1PRESTPi + 2IFRSi + 3PRESTPxIFRSi + 4MULTIPLEi +  
5FRIENDLYi + 6CASHPAYTi + 7TOEHOLDi + 8TGTDIROWNi + 9TGTROEi + 
10TGTLEVi + 11TGTSIZEi + 12TGTFCFi   +13BIDMBi+14BIDDIROWNi+ 
15BIDROEi+ 16BIDLEVi + 17BIDSIZEi + 18BIDFCFi  + INDUSTRY + i                  (1b) 
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that glamour acquirers pay higher premiums and experience 
poorer post- merger performance. To control for this effect we include the bidding firm market-
to-book (BIDMB) ratio two months before the takeover announcement. We include the 
percentage ownership of the bidding firm board of directors at the time of the takeover 
announcement (BIDDIROWN). If bidders are more likely to overpay when they are subject to 
greater agency problems, then a negative association is predicted between this variable and 
premiums. Bidder performance and leverage are added to the model using, respectively, the 
return on equity (BIDROE) and debt-to-equity ratios (BIDLEV). Larger bidders have greater 
negotiating power suggesting a reduction in premiums. Jensen (1986) argues that bidders with 
free cash flow may be willing to undertake value destroying acquisitions thus predicting a 
positive association between free cash flow and premiums. Bidding firm size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (BIDSIZE), whilst free cash flow is calculated as 
operating cash flows less dividends, divided by average total assets (BIDFCF). The previous 
four variables are measured using financial information collected from the most recent 
financial statements issued before the takeover announcement. 
In both regression models (1a and 1b), standard errors are clustered by year and target industry. 
The models also include industry indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects based 
on the target firm two-digit GICS code. We do not control for year fixed effects because the 




5. Sample and descriptive statistics 
The Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions Database is used to identify 942 takeovers for 
Australian publicly listed targets between 1997 and 2009. We exclude 340 takeovers for which 
the amount of PRESTP is negative. We do however, use this subset of firms as a control group 
for which we expect no change in premiums before and after the adoption of IFRS (see section 
6.3). 
To ensure that only bidders subject to Australian accounting standards are analysed, we 
removed 186 takeovers by bidders domiciled outside Australia. Finally, we excluded 36 
takeovers for which there was insufficient data to estimate model (1a) leaving a sample of 380. 
In the estimation of model (1b) we also exclude 64 takeovers announced by non-listed 
Australian bidders as it is not possible to obtain financial information for these firms. Panel A 
of Table 1 summarises the sample selection process. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Panel B presents the temporal distribution of the sample. The highest numbers of takeovers 
are in 2006 and 2007. The period with the fewest takeovers are the first three years of the 
sample. Approximately 48% of takeovers are announced between 1997 and 2004. 
Financial data is hand collected from financial reports released for the one and two financial 
years immediately before the takeover announcement. Details on offer price, consideration 
form, the target firm board recommendation and ownership details of the bidder and target firm 
directors are manually extracted from takeover documents lodged with the Australian 
Securities Exchange. The Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database is used to source 
takeover documents and target and bidder firm financial reports. Share price data is obtained 
from SIRCA’s Core Research Database. 
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The existence of an accounting-based bonus plan for bidding firm CEOs is determined by 
manually checking the annual report for the year before the takeover. As some firms provided 
insufficient remuneration disclosures to identify whether a CEO bonus plan existed, we exclude 
65 observations leaving a sample of 251 takeovers. Due to insufficient disclosure, we cannot 
determine if the CEOs remunerated with an accounting-based bonus plan are compensated 
using a measure of profit that includes or excludes amortisation charges. As a result, our 
classification scheme may be inaccurate and potentially biases us against finding a result. 
Furthermore, we cannot determine from disclosures whether bonuses are based on rolling 
GAAP. However, discussions with two remuneration consultants suggest that firms use rolling 
GAAP for the purposes of determining bonuses based on accounting performance. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models. We 
also show means for each variable partitioned by whether the takeover was announced pre- or 
post- IFRS. Within our sample, 52% of bids are announced post- IFRS. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Similar to prior research, target shareholders are offered large premiums which average 
approximately 30% (median is 16%). The average pre-acquisition step-up is 529% of target’s 
equity and 150% of target’s average assets. As the median PRESTPEQ is only 111% of the 
book value of target equity, the distribution of PRESTPEQ is skewed. Although premiums and 
the pre-acquisition step-up are both higher subsequent to the adoption of IFRS, a t-test indicates 
that the differences are not statistically significant except for PRESTPASSETS.9  
Accounting-based bonus plans (BONUS) are offered by 59% of bidding firms. Although the 
post-IFRS sample has a higher proportion of bidders using accounting based bonus 
                                                 
9 A comparison of medians (unreported) before and after IFRS adoption is insignificant for PRESTPEQ. For 
PRESTPASSETS the median is significantly higher after the adoption of IFRS. 
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compensation the difference to the pre- IFRS sample is insignificant. The majority of takeovers 
(i.e., 67%) in the sample are friendly and exclusively cash payment is offered in 42% of bids. 
The median target return on equity and free cash flow are positive indicating that the majority 
of targets are not poorly performing. For bidding firms the average level of board ownership is 
14% and the median return on equity is 11%. After the adoption of IFRS, takeovers are less 
likely to have competing bidders and cash payment is used less frequently. Furthermore, target 
firm size, the bidding firm market-to-book ratio and bidding firm leverage are higher 
subsequent to the implementation of IFRS. 
We calculate Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent and (non-binary) 
independent variables included in the regression models, but in the interests of brevity do not 
present the results. The correlation between premiums and the pre-acquisition step-up are 
insignificant, whilst the correlation between PRESTPEQ and PRESTPASSETS is positive and 
significant (0.29). The correlations between the pre-acquisition step-up and the other 
independent variables are generally insignificant. The only exceptions are between PRESTPEQ 
and respectively TGTROE (-0.65) and TGTLEV (0.77). The size of the other significant 
correlations suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem with the estimation of model (1) 
(Gujarati 1995). This is confirmed by the calculation of VIF diagnostics after the estimation of 
each regression model. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Primary tests and findings 
Table 3 provides the results of estimating the regression models. The findings are presented 
separately for both the full sample and only listed bidders using alternatively the two different 
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scalars of the step-up.10 The adjusted R-squared of the regressions range from 7% to 19%, 
whilst the F-statistics indicate that each model is significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The coefficient on both PRESTPEQ and PRESTPASSETS are negative and significant 
supporting H1. To assess the economic significance of our findings we use the coefficients on 
the results in Table 3 and the descriptive statistics for the mean and median step-up reported in 
Table 2. For PRESTPEQ a move from the median (1.11) to the mean (5.29) implies a reduction 
in the premium of between 5.4%-7.1%. In comparison, for PRESTPASSETS a move from the 
median (0.59) to the mean (1.50) suggests a decline in the premium of between 2.3%-2.6%. 
Consistent with H2, when we scale the pre-acquisition step-up by equity the coefficient on 
PRESTPxIFRS is positive and significant at 5% for the full sample and 1% for the sample of 
listed bidders. The coefficient on PRESTPxIFRS is also positive and significant when we scale 
PRESTP by average target firm assets, although the result is only significant at the 10% level 
for the full sample of takeovers. Overall our results suggest that the negative association 
between the pre-acquisition step-up of the target firm and premiums diminished once bidding 
firms were no longer required to amortise goodwill. It is notable that the coefficient on the 
IFRS indicator variable is insignificant indicating no change in premiums before and after 2005 
after controlling for the interaction of IFRS with the pre-acquisition step-up. We once again 
assess the economic significance of our findings on PRESTPxIFRS using the mean and median 
pre-acquisition step-up. Our results suggest that a move from the median to mean PRESTPEQ 
or PRESTPASSETS respectively leads to a 4.6-6.7% or 2%-2.4% increase in the premium after 
the adoption of IFRS.11 
                                                 
10 The number of observations is reduced when PRESTP is scaled by average assets as it was not possible to 
obtain the opening balance of assets for a number of target firms. 
11 As an additional test the models were estimated (results not reported) after excluding the interaction variable 
and the IFRS dummy. The coefficient on PRESTP was insignificant. 
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A number of control variables report significant coefficients in Table 3. Premiums significantly 
increase with bidder firm size consistent with these bidders having access to greater resources. 
Target size is inversely associated with premiums similar to the results in Anderson, et al. 
(1994). Target firm leverage and ROE are positively associated with premiums when we use 
PRESTPEQ as the measure of the step-up. The result on target firm leverage is consistent with 
the findings in Israel (1992). 
6.2 Impact of bidding firm CEO compensation structure 
We predict that the association between takeover premiums and the target firm pre-acquisition 
step-up before and after Australia adopted IFRS differs for firms with and without an 
accounting-based CEO compensation plan. To test H3, we partition the sample of listed bidders 
into firms with (144 firms) (BONUS = 1) and without (BONUS = 0) (107 firms) a CEO 
accounting-based bonus plan and estimate model 1(b) separately for the two groups. These 
results are presented in Table 4.12 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Compared to Table 3, the results in Table 4 show increased explanatory power of the model 
with the adjusted R-squared ranging from 26.7% to 34.6%. This is greater than that reported in 
both Robinson and Shane (1990) and Ayers et al. (2002). The F-statistics also indicate that the 
models are significant.  
In takeovers where the bidding firm’s CEO is not remunerated using an accounting-based 
bonus plan, the interaction term between PRESTP (both PRESTPEQ and PRESTPASSETS) 
and IFRS are insignificant indicating no change in this association after IFRS adoption. The 
coefficient on PRESTP is also insignificant. In contrast, the findings for takeovers in which the 
CEO has an accounting-based bonus plan are consistent with those presented in Table 3. Our 
                                                 
12 Again the sample size is reduced when we scale PRESTP by average assets. 
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results support prior research which documents the influence of the structure of management 
compensation plans on accounting choice and suggest that CEO accounting-based 
compensation, increases the risk of wealth transfers from bidding to target firm shareholders. 
The results in Table 4 show an increase in the number of significant control variables compared 
to Table 3. For example, better performing bidders (ROE) pay significantly higher premiums. 
Similar to the findings in Table 3 target and bidder size are respectively negatively and 
positively associated with premiums. The positive association between the bidding firm 
market-to-book ratio and premiums is similar to that found in Rau and Vermaelen (1998). It is 
notable however, that when the bidder has an accounting-based CEO bonus plan in place, the 
bidder market-to-book ratio is negatively related to premiums. Inconsistent with earlier 
research (Stulz et al., 1990) a larger toehold is associated with higher premiums when the 
bidding CEO is compensated using an accounting-based bonus plan.  
 
6.3 Additional testing 
6.3.1 Alternative interpretations on step-up  
A possible concern with our results is that since the pre-acquisition step-up approximates the 
market-to-book ratio there may be alternative explanations for our findings. Whilst we argue 
below that the theoretical validity of these alternative explanations does not appear as strong 
as the argument we have presented, we cannot completely rule them out.  
Accounting conservatism 
The market-to-book ratio has been used in prior research as a measure of conservatism (Wang 
et al., 2009). An alternative explanation for our findings, therefore, is that bidding firms pay 
lower premiums for targets with conservative accounting and this association weakened after 
2005. Given the benefits of accounting conservatism documented in earlier studies, it seems 
unlikely that target firms with more conservative accounting are likely to be ‘punished’ through 
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the payment of a lower premium.13. However, if we accept the argument that more conservative 
targets receive a lower premium, the weakening of this association post-IFRS would suggest 
that accounting became less conservative after Australia adopted IFRS. This is, however, 
inconsistent with the evidence in Lai et al. (2013a) who show that after Australia adopted IFRS, 
unconditional conservatism measured using a firm’s market-to-book ratio increased.  
To provide some evidence on whether our results are consistent with conservatism we follow 
Balakrishna et al. (2007) and Lai et al. (2013a) and use the frequency of target firm losses as a 
measure of conservatism. Specifically, we measure conservatism as the proportion of target 
firm earnings which are negative over the five years before the takeover (CONSERVATISM). 
We then estimate our regression models replacing PRESTP with CONSERVATISM. We find 
an insignificant association between premiums and our proxy for conservatism. Furthermore, 
the interaction term between CONSERVATISM and IFRS is also insignificant. These findings 
suggest that our results on PRESTP are not explained by conservatism. 
Target firm risky growth 
The market-to-book ratio has also been used as a measure of the risk in buying earnings growth 
(e.g., Penman and Reggiani, 2013). An alternative explanation for our results, therefore, is that 
bidding firms pay lower premiums for targets with risky growth opportunities perhaps due to 
the greater uncertainty associated with future growth. Whilst such an argument is plausible, it 
cannot explain why bidders would increase premiums for uncertain growth prospects post- 
2005, particularly in light of the global financial crisis (GFC). In an attempt to assess if PRESTP 
is proxying for firm growth we replace the PRESTP variable in our regression analysis with 
target firm sales growth in the two years before the takeover announcement (GROWTH).14 We 
                                                 
13 Some of these benefits include: a lower cost of debt (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008); higher corporate 
governance quality (Lara et al., 2009); more profitable acquisitions (Francis and Martin, 2010) and higher 
announcement returns to seasoned equity offerings (Kim et al., 2013). 
14 We use pre-takeover sales growth as a proxy for expected growth due to the unavailability of expected growth 
data. Wyatt (2005) for example uses industry level growth estimates provided by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) to proxy for earnings growth. However the ABS no longer collates this data. 
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also interact this new variable with our IFRS dummy (GROWTHxIFRS). The results indicate 
that target firm sales growth is not significantly associated with premiums and suggest that our 
results on PRESTP are not explained by target firm growth. 
Tech bubble and the global financial crisis 
Finally, we test if our results are sensitive to the exclusion of certain sub-periods. For example, 
it could be argued that PRESTP proxies for firm overvaluation and that this measure was seen 
as a more reliable measure of overvaluation in the pre-IFRS period perhaps due to the “tech-
bubble.” In contrast, in the post- IFRS period, perhaps, due to the global financial crisis this 
measure no longer provided a credible signal of overvaluation. To test this possibility we re-
estimate our analysis by excluding alternately the “tech-bubble” years (i.e., 2000-2001) and the 
years affected by the global financial crisis (2008-2009). The interpretations from our findings 
are unchanged. 
6.3.2 Functional fixation on earnings 
Following the arguments from  Hand (1990) (i.e., earnings functional fixation hypothesis), we 
test whether managers who adjust premiums for changes in the goodwill accounting rules are 
those who believe their investors are unsophisticated and thus less likely to ‘see through’ the 
effect of accounting rule changes. To conduct this analysis we partition our sample using 
median firm size into sophisticated (i.e., large firms) and unsophisticated firms (i.e., small 
firms) and repeat the analysis in Table 3. The results (not tabulated) are largely inconsistent 
with the functional fixation hypothesis.15 
6.3.3 Placebo tests 
                                                 
15 We also use median substantial shareholder ownership to partition into investor sophistication groups and 
obtain similar results. Additionally, we include blockholder ownership percentages and the number of 
blockholders alternatively in our regression models as an additional variable and find no significant association 
between both variables and premiums. The conclusions or our main test variables are unchanged. 
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As described in Pope and Macleay (2011), researchers face an identification problem in 
attempting to attribute an observed outcome to the adoption of IFRS. We attempt to address 
the identification problem in a number of ways. 
Firms with a negative step-up 
First, we identify target firms for which our measure of the pre-acquisition step-up is negative. 
As accounting rules for a bargain purchase was not modified with IFRS adoption, we expect 
no change in the association between premiums and a bargain purchase pre- and post-IFRS. To 
test for such an effect we replace PRESTP in regression model (1) with the absolute value of 
any bargain purchase (DISC) scaled alternatively using the book value of equity (DISCEQ) and 
average assets (DISCASSETS). This bargain purchase measure is then interacted with the IFRS 
dummy (DISCxIFRS). The results (not tabulated) show an insignificant association between a 
bargain purchase and premiums. Importantly, the interaction term DISCxIFRS is also 
insignificant indicating that the association was unchanged after the adoption of IFRS. 
U.S. takeovers 
The second placebo test estimates model (1) using U.S. takeover data for publicly listed targets 
between 2002 and 2009. We start the sample from 2002 as this is the first full year which 
required the use of the purchase method in the U.S. Details of takeovers and the data 
requirements are obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat and Corporate Library. The IFRS 
variable included in the regression is a notional IFRS dummy denoting takeovers announced 
from 2005 onwards. Table 5 presents the results. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The findings show an insignificant coefficient on the interaction between the notional IFRS 
dummy and the measure of the target firm pre-takeover step-up. As there was no change in 
accounting method for goodwill in the U.S. in 2005, this insignificant result is unsurprising. 
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More importantly these results provide additional confidence that the findings documented in 
this study for Australia are not explained by another confounding event. 
Loss making firms 
We also examine if our results are sensitive to whether the bidding firm is profit-making since 
CEOs of bidding firms making losses are likely to be less concerned as to the use of accounting 
numbers in compensation contracts.  To undertake this analysis we re-estimate the analysis 
presented in Table 4 and replace BIDROE with an indicator variable denoting bidders making 
a loss in the year prior to the takeover announcement (LOSS). We also interact this variable 
with the IFRS dummy (LOSSxIFRS).16 We find a negative association between LOSS and 
PREMIUM whilst the interaction between LOSS and IFRS is insignificant indicating loss firms 
did not alter their premiums after IFRS adoption. The conclusions from our main test variables 
are unchanged. 
6.3.4 Variation in industry takeover activity over time 
Prior research indicates that takeovers occur in waves and cluster across time within industry 
(Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Harford 2005). We construct a merger and acquisition cycle 
variable calculated as the percentage of firms in the target firm’s industry which receive a 
takeover offer in the year before the takeover announcement (M&ACYCLE). We then repeat 
our analysis including this additional variable. The findings on M&ACYCLE are insignificant 
in the regressions that include PRESTPEQ. In the regressions which include PRESTPASSETS, 
we find a negative association between takeover premiums and M&ACYCLE consistent with 
the findings in Duong and Izan (2012). Importantly, the conclusions on our main findings are 
unchanged. 
                                                 
16 Due to the small sample size we are unable to estimate our models after partitioning bidding firms which have 
a CEO bonus plan into those which are loss-making (N = 14) and those which are profitable (N =113). 
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As an additional test we compare the average step-up for each target firm industry (pre- and 
post- IFRS. We find a significant difference after IFRS for GICS code 15 (Materials) and GICS 
code 25 (Consumer discretionary). We re-estimate our regression models with the inclusion of 
an interaction term between the industry indicator variables for these two industries and the 
IFRS dummy. The coefficients on the industry indicator variables and the new interaction 
variables are insignificant. Our main findings remain unchanged. 
6.3.5 Other tests 
Goodwin et al., (2008) discuss the main changes to Australian GAAP upon the adoption of 
IFRS. In relation to the accounting for takeovers, the most pertinent non-goodwill change was 
in regards to identifiable intangible assets.17 Prior to 2005 there was no accounting standard for 
identifiable intangible assets (other than research and development). Subsequent to IFRS 
adoption, AASB 138 required the recognition of purchased identifiable intangibles and the 
amortisation of such assets with a finite life. AASB 138 prohibited the recognition of internally 
developed intangibles.18 To empirically test for an association between target firm intangible 
assets and premiums we manually collect the amount of intangible assets recognised in each 
successful takeover.19 We construct a dummy variable equal to one (IIA_DUMMY) if a bidder 
recognises intangible assets and zero otherwise. We also interact this dummy variable with the 
IFRS dummy (IIA_DUMMYxIFRS). We then re-estimate model (1) with the inclusion of these 
additional two variables. The coefficients on both additional variables are insignificant. 
Furthermore, the main findings of our paper remain unchanged.20 
                                                 
17 Although, the adoption of IFRS altered the accounting rules in many other areas, these changes had no direct 
impact on the accounting for business combinations. We do not believe these other changes explain our results.  
18 The exception is development expenditure which can be recognised if strict conditions are met. 
19 It is necessary to use the amount of intangible assets recorded after the acquisition as not all intangible assets 
appear on the target firm balance sheet (e.g., internally generated intangible assets). A weakness with our 
approach is that the allocation of the purchase price across asset types is subject to managerial discretion. 
20 We also conduct this analysis using the amount of identifiable intangible assets recorded in the acquisition 
scaled by target firm assets instead of the IIA_DUMMY variable. Our main findings remain unchanged. 
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To examine whether existing bidding firm goodwill influences premiums we re-estimated our 
models including an indicator variable for bidders with a non-zero goodwill balance. The 
coefficient on this additional variable is insignificant and the results for our test variables of 
interest are unchanged. To assess if outliers impact our findings, we repeat our analysis using 
rank-regression and after winsorising the top and bottom 1% of our continuous variables. The 
conclusions from our findings are similar to those presented. The conclusion from our results 
are also unchanged if we calculate premiums using the target share price one month or ten days 
before the announcement date. 
It may be contended that our premise that target firms with a higher step-up receive lower 
premiums is unrealistic as it ignores the need for target firm cooperation to achieve takeover 
success.21 To empirically examine this contention, we estimate a logit regression with 
alternatively a successful takeover outcome or takeover hostility as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables in these models are identical to those in regression model 1 except that 
FRIENDLY is excluded in the model of takeover hostility as it is now used as the dependent 
variable. The results for these models (not reported) show no association between both takeover 
hostility and takeover outcome and the target firm pre-acquisition step-up. Furthermore, this 
association is unaltered after the adoption of IFRS. 
Table 2 shows a number of control variables report significant differences after IFRS. To 
examine if the association between these controls and premiums varies across time, we re-
estimate our models (alternately for each significant control) after including an interaction 
variable between each control and the IFRS dummy. We find a negative association between 
MULTIPLExIFRS and premiums, whilst the other interaction variables are insignificant. The 
conclusions on the main findings are unchanged. 
 
                                                 
21 As this line of argument indicates that takeovers of firms with a higher pre-acquisition step-up are more likely 




This study examines the association between takeover premiums and the target firm pre-
acquisition step-up. Our results show a negative association between premiums and the pre-
acquisition step-up with this association decreasing after IFRS adoption. These findings 
suggest that when a greater proportion of the step-up is required to be expensed, bidders pay 
less for targets with a higher step-up prior to the acquisition to avoid a further reduction in post- 
acquisition profit. However, after the adoption of IFRS, when goodwill is no longer amortised, 
this discounting of premiums for targets with a higher pre-acquisition step-up no longer occurs.  
We also document that the change in the association between premiums and the target firm 
pre-acquisition step-up post- IFRS holds only for bidders which offer an accounting-based 
performance plan to their CEOs prior to the takeover announcement. Our findings are therefore 
consistent with an unintended consequence of Australia’s adoption of IFRS, being an increase 
in premiums for target firms with a larger step-up. These findings add to the CEO compensation 
literature by showing that the structure of the CEO compensation can have unintended 
consequences following a change in accounting standards. 
A caveat regarding the results in this study is the possibility that a change in an omitted 
variable occurring at the same time as IFRS adoption explains our results. While the 
additional testing we conduct suggests that this is not the case, the possibility that a 
confounding event drives our results must be acknowledged. Future research could extend 
our study to examine whether managers exercise discretion in the allocation of the purchase 
price across different assets acquired in a business combination, and whether the exercise of 
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Table 1 Sample Construction 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Takeovers between 1997 and 2009 on the Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions 
database  942 
Exclusions:   
Target firms with a negative step-up 340  
Firms reporting with non-Australian GAAP 186  
Missing data for regression model 36 (562) 
Total sample size to estimate model (1a)  380 
Bidder firms non-listed  64 




Panel B: Distribution of takeovers by year 
Year Number Proportion 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
1997 18 4.74 4.74 
1998 18 4.74 9.48 
1999 19 5.00 14.48 
2000 24 6.32 20.80 
2001 23 6.05 26.85 
2002 20 5.26 32.11 
2003 25 6.58 38.69 
2004 35 9.21 47.90 
2005 31 8.16 56.06 
2006 53 13.95 70.01 
2007 60 15.79 85.80 
2008 31 8.16 93.96 
2009 
 
23 6.05 100.00 
Total 380 100%  
34 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression models for the entire sample and 
separately pre- and post- IFRS. A test of statistical difference before and after the adoption of IFRS for each 
variable is also shown. A t-test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test for binary variables. PREMIUM is 
the takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share price two months before the takeover 
announcement, divided by the target share price two months before the takeover announcement; PRESTPEQ is 
the target firm market value of equity two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of 
equity, divided by the book value of equity; PRESTPASSETS is the target firm market value of equity two 
months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by average assets; IFRS is an 
indicator variable denoting takeovers announced after Australia adopted IFRS; MULTIPLE is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm; FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 1 if 
the initial recommendation of the target firm board of directors is to accept the takeover offer; CASHPAYT is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash; TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the 
bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover; TGTDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the 
target board of directors; TGTROE is the return on equity ratio of the target firm; TGTLEV is the debt-to-equity 
ratio of the target firm; TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the target firm, and 
TGTFCF is free cash flow of the target firm scaled by average total assets; BIDMB is the market-to-book ratio 
of the bidding firm; BIDDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the bidder’s board of directors; BIDROE is the 
return on equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the bidding firm; and BIDFCF is free cash flow of the bidding firm 
scaled by average total assets. BONUS is a dummy variable coded as one for bidding firms which compensate 
their CEO using an accounting-based bonus plan in the year before the takeover announcement. All accounting 
variables are collected from the financial statements released before the takeover announcement. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std dev Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Stat diff  
PREMIUM 380 0.299 0.162 1.758 0.214 0.378 -0.94 
PRESTPEQ 380 5.291 1.107 31.033 3.661 6.790 -1.01 
PRESTPASSETS 377 1.503 0.591 0.171 1.079 1.887 -2.37** 
IFRS 380 0.521 1.000 0.500 - - - 
MULTIPLE 380 0.190 0.000 0.392 0.224 0.157 1.68* 
FRIENDLY 380 0.668 1.000 0.471 0.639 0.692 -1.09 
CASHPAYT 380 0.416 0.000 0.494 0.470 0.364 2.10** 
TOEHOLD 380 0.118 0.002 0.176 0.128 0.109 1.06 
TGTDIROWN 380 0.109 0.025 0.167 0.095 0.122 -1.57 
TGTROE 380 -0.097 0.076 0.826 -0.056 -0.133 0.92 
TGTLEV 380 2.648 0.809 12.874 2.215 3.046 -0.62 
TGTSIZE 380 18.562 18.482 1.960 18.238 18.866 -3.21*** 
TGTFCF 380 -0.035 0.000 0.223 -0.031 -0.038 0.28 
BIDMB 316 3.539 2.135 6.376 2.504 4.485 -2.91*** 
BIDDIROWN 316 0.136 0.051 0.181 0.143 0.124 1.16 
BIDROE 316 -0.002 0.114 1.632 0.104 -0.098 1.16 
BIDLEV 316 1.858 0.834 4.246 1.143 2.538 -3.07*** 
BIDSIZE 316 19.926 19.919 2.403 19.703 20.129 -1.59 
BIDFCF 316 0.143 0.046 1.873 0.056 0.222 -0.78 
BONUS 251 0.591 1.000 0.493 0.559 0.613 -0.38 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3 Regression results of H1 and H2 
This table presents the results of estimating the regression models where PREMIUM is the takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share price two months before the 
takeover announcement, divided by the target share price two months before the takeover announcement; PRESTP is measured as (i) PRESTPEQ which is the target firm market value of equity 
two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity and (ii) PRESTPASSETS which is the target firm market value of equity two 
months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by average assets; IFRS is an indicator variable denoting takeovers announced after Australia adopted IFRS; 
PRESTPxIFRS is an interaction variable between PRESTP and IFRS; MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm; FRIENDLY is an indicator variable 
set to 1 if the initial recommendation of the target firm board of directors is to accept the takeover offer; CASHPAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash; 
TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover; TGTDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the target board of directors; TGTROE is 
the return on equity ratio of the target firm; TGTLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the target firm; TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the target firm, and TGTFCF is 
free cash flow of the target firm scaled by average total assets; BIDMB is the market-to-book ratio of the bidding firm; BIDDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the bidder’s board of directors; 
BIDROE is the return on equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDSIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the bidding firm; and 
BIDFCF is free cash flow of the bidding firm scaled by average total assets. All accounting variables are collected from the financial statements released before the takeover announcement. 
Standard errors are clustered by year and target firm industry. Industry fixed effects are included in each model but results are not reported. 
 PRESTP scaled by Book Value of Equity (PRESTPEQ) PRESTP scaled by Average Assets (PRESTPASSETS) 
 Coefficient  (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient  (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
 Full sample Listed bidders Full sample Listed bidders 
Intercept 1.533 (3.12)*** 1.276 (1.82)* 1.354 (3.00)*** 1.127 (1.70)* 
PRESTP -0.017 (-2.25)** -0.013 (-4.29)*** -0.025 (-2.30)** -0.028 (-2.27)** 
IFRS -0.085 (-0.70) -0.072 (-056) -0.070 (-0.66) -0.082 (-0.65) 
PRESTPxIFRS 0.016 (2.22)** 0.011 (3.68)*** 0.022 (1.67)* 0.026 (2.28)** 
MULTIPLE -0.010 (-0.09) -0.099 (-0.81) -0.009 (-0.07) -0.103 (-0.91) 
FRIENDLY 0.189 (0.70) -0.101 (-1.15) 0.208 (0.75) -0.072 (-1.29) 
CASHPAYT -0.266 (-1.07) -0.148 (-0.98) -0.271 (-1.11) -0.161 (-1.12) 
TOEHOLD 0.119 (0.75) 0.290 (1.54) 0.156 (1.14) 0.341 (2.01)** 
TGTDIROWN 0.057 (0.52) -0.009 (-0.08) 0.075 (0.26) 0.019 (0.14) 
TGTROE 0.004 (1.66)* 0.002 (1.83)* -0.000 (-0.15) -0.001 (-1.47) 
TGTLEV 0.014 (1.86)* 0.008 (3.17)*** -0.004 (-0.94) -0.006 (-6.17)*** 
TGTSIZE -0.061 (-2.34)** -0.112 (-3.09)*** -0.052 (-2.04)** -0.103 (-2.69)*** 
TGTFCF  -0.307 (-1.37) -0.298 (-0.97) -0.311 (-1.37) -0.309 (-0.97) 
BIDMB   -0.001 (-0.25)   -0.000 (-0.36) 
BIDDIROWN   -0.102 (-0.30)   -0.050 (-0.14) 
BIDROE   0.003 (0.34)   0.003 (0.31) 
BIDLEV   0.001 (0.15)   0.008 (0.95) 
BIDSIZE   0.061 (1.72)*   0.060 (7.82)*** 
BIDFCF    0.002 (-0.24)   0.001 (0.16) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185  0.086  0.181  0.074  
F-statistic 1.72  1.93  2.39  3.65  
P-value 0.043  0.023  0.003  0.000  
Observations 380  316  371  241  
*** Significant at the 1% level       ** Significant at the 5% level     * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 Regression results testing H3 for firms with and without a bonus plan 
This table presents the results of estimating the regression models for bidders with and without accounting-based bonus plans.  PREMIUM is the takeover premium calculated as the offer price 
minus the target share price two months before the takeover announcement, divided by the target share price two months before the takeover announcement; PRESTP is measured as (i) PRESTPEQ 
which is the target firm market value of equity two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity and (ii) PRESTPASSETS which 
is the target firm market value of equity two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by average assets; IFRS is an indicator variable denoting takeovers 
announced after Australia adopted IFRS; PRESTPxIFRS is an interaction variable between PRESTP and IFRS; MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the 
target firm;  FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 1 if the initial recommendation of the target firm board of directors is to accept the takeover offer;  CASHPAYT is an indicator variable set 
to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash; TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover; TGTDIROWN is the percentage ownership 
of the target board of directors; TGTROE is the return on equity ratio of the target firm; TGTLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the target firm; TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalisation of the target firm, and TGTFCF is free cash flow of the target firm scaled by average total assets; BIDMB is the market-to-book ratio of the bidding firm; BIDDIROWN is the 
percentage ownership of the bidder’s board of directors; BIDROE is the return on equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation of the bidding firm; and BIDFCF is free cash flow of the bidding firm scaled by average total assets.  All accounting variables are collected from the financial 
statements released before the takeover announcement. Standard errors are clustered by year and target firm industry. Industry fixed effects are included in each model but results are not reported. 
 PRESTP scaled by Book Value of Equity (PRESTPEQ) PRESTP scaled by Average Assets (PRESTPASSETS) 
 BONUS = 0 BONUS = 1 BONUS = 0 BONUS = 1 
Variables Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
Intercept 0.365 (0.59) 0.194 (0.37) 0.688 (1.48) 0.472 (0.98) 
PRESTP 0.020 (1.50) -0.023 (-7.82)*** 0.016 (0.41) -0.210 (-2.74)*** 
IFRS 0.150 (1.93)* 0.081 (1.22) 0.022 (0.17) -0.029 (-0.22) 
PRESTPxIFRS -0.036 (-1.20) 0.022 (8.05)*** 0.009 (0.21) 0.207 (2.60)** 
MULTIPLE -0.053 (-0.55) 0.056 (0.61) -0.041 (-0.43) 0.122 (0.99) 
FRIENDLY -0.027 (-0.33) 0.024 (0.36) -0.051 (-0.76) 0.025 (0.40) 
CASHPAYT -0.117 (-1.11) -0.046 (-0.35) -0.087 (-0.72) -0.056 (-0.48) 
TOEHOLD -0.066 (0.36) 0.568 (2.53)** 0.126 (0.51) 0.599 (2.01)** 
TGTDIROWN -0.207 (-1.25) 0.151 (5.53)*** -0.252 (-0.87) 0.024 (1.01) 
TGTROE -0.009 (-2.75)*** 0.095 (2.21)** 0.004 (0.86) 0.121 (3.45)*** 
TGTLEV 0.015 (0.57) 0.008 (1.70)* 0.014 (0.81) 0.003 (1.25) 
TGTSIZE -0.059 (-1.41) -0.078 (-2.76)*** -0.063 (-1.84)* -0.090 (-2.77)*** 
TGTFCF  -0.030 (-0.31) -0.016 (-0.15) -0.078 (-0.76) 0.057 (0.41) 
BIDMB 0.014 (2.13)** -0.001 (-2.51)*** 0.013 (2.03)** -0.000 (-3.66)*** 
BIDDIROWN 0.100 (0.34) -0.290 (-1.24) 0.102 (0.38) -0.458 (-1.47) 
BIDROE 0.121 (3.55)*** 0.016 (2.50)** 0.095 (3.70)*** 0.012 (4.33)*** 
BIDLEV -0.032 (-1.34) -0.006 (-1.10) -0.025 (-1.36) 0.004 (0.06) 
BIDSIZE 0.053 (2.18)** 0.068 (2.24)** 0.043 (1.41) 0.068 (2.35)** 
BIDFCF  -0.093 (-0.27) 0.005 (0.98) -0.101 (-0.74) -0.002 (-0.34) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.267  0.274  0.272  0.346  
F-statistics 9.27  66.63  8.99  327.14  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Observations 107  144  89  117  
*** Significant at the 1% level   ** Significant at the 5% level   * Significant at the 10% level 
37 
 
Table 5 Regression results using a sample of US takeovers 
This table presents the results of estimating regression model 1(b) using a sample of US takeovers.  PREMIUM is the takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share price 
two months before the takeover announcement, divided by the target share price two months before the takeover announcement; PRESTP is measured as (i) PRESTPEQ which is the target firm 
market value of equity two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity and (ii) PRESTPASSETS which is the target firm market 
value of equity two months before the takeover announcement minus the book value of equity, divided by average assets; IFRS is an indicator variable denoting takeovers announced after Australia 
adopted IFRS; PRESTPxIFRS is an interaction variable between PRESTP and IFRS; MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm;  FRIENDLY is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the initial recommendation of the target firm board of directors is to accept the takeover offer;  CASHPAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is 
exclusively cash; TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover; TGTDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the target board of 
directors; TGTROE is the return on equity ratio of the target firm; TGTLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the target firm; TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the target 
firm, and TGTFCF is free cash flow of the target firm scaled by average total assets; BIDMB is the market-to-book ratio of the bidding firm; BIDDIROWN is the percentage ownership of the 
bidder’s board of directors; BIDROE is the return on equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDLEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the bidding firm; BIDSIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
of the bidding firm; and BIDFCF is free cash flow of the bidding firm scaled by average total assets.  All accounting variables are collected from the financial statements released before the 
takeover announcement. Industry fixed effects are included in each model but results are not reported. 
 PRESTP scaled by Book Value of Equity (PRESTPEQ) PRESTP scaled by Average Assets 
(PRESTPASSETS) 
 Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
Intercept 11.713 (0.78) 8.646 (0.62) 
PRESTP 0.718 (0.65) -1.643 (-0.60) 
IFRS 1.464 (0.31) 0.543 (0.10) 
PRESTPxIFRS 0.374 (0.34) 1.077 (0.35) 
MULTIPLE 23.006 (2.23)** 23.568 (2.18)** 
HOSTILE 12.742 (1.65)* 11.557 (1.44) 
CASHPAYT 3.136 (0.61) 4.075 (0.79) 
TOEHOLD 0.301 (0.26) 0.309 (0.26) 
TGTDIROWN 0. 442 (0.53) 0.467 (0.54) 
TGTROE 0.851 (0.31) -0.428 (-0.21) 
TGTLEV -1.181 (-0.84) 0.236 (0.37) 
TGTSIZE -9.228 (-4.92)*** -8.365 (-4.63)*** 
TGTFCF  30.391 (1.81)* 31.784 (1.91)* 
BIDMB -1.521 (-0.60) -0.572 (-0.22) 
BIDDIROWN -0.019 (-0.04) -0.124 (-0.27) 
BIDROE 3.333 (0.28) 5.687 (0.71) 
BIDLEV 1.878 (0.54) 0.902 (0.41) 
BIDSIZE 8.286 (3.93)*** 8.127 (3.85)*** 
BIDFCF  -0.955 (-0.03) -0.238 (-0.01) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253  0.306  
F-statistic 3.23  3.28  
P-value 0.00  0.00  
Observations 389  347  
              *** Significant at the 1% level       ** Significant at the 5% level     * Significant at the 10% level 
